Manual de Direito do Trabalho
Xavier, Bernardo da Gama Lobo
2011-01-01
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This paper presents an incentive-based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks. The paper builds on the models concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of E. Green (1987), J. Thomas and T. Worrall (1991), C. Phelan and R. Townsend (1991), and A. Atkeson and R. Lucas (1992). By incorporating aggregate production shocks, the model allows an examination of the interactions between individual and aggregate consumption series given incomplete insurance. Further, the methodology outlined allows the incorporation of incentive considerations to macroeconomic environments similar to R. Rogerson (1988) and G. Hansen (1985). Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Mechanism design Robustness
This paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multiperiod (including infinite-period), continuum-agent, unobserved-effort economy. Actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross-sectional variability in consumption and labor effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time. The optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full-information economy and various restricted-contracting regimes. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
